Re-thinking the regulatory environment of credit reporting: Could legislation stem privacy and discrimination concerns? by Ferretti, F
Re-thinking the regulatory environment of credit reporting: Could 
legislation stem privacy and discrimination concerns? 
Federico Ferretti 
Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Volume 14, Number 3, 2006 , pp. 254-
272(19) 
Federico Ferretti is a qualified lawyer under the High Courts of Italy and a PhD candidate of 
the School of Law, University of Leeds.  After having earned an LL.M and an MA from the 
University of Sussex, he worked both as in-house lawyer for a Credit Reference Agency and in 
private practice.  His research interests are in the area of EU law, commercial law & 
practice, privacy, and consumers rights. 
Abstract 
Keywords: Credit Reference Agencies, consumer credit, privacy, discrimination, 
regulation. 
This paper examines the activities carried out in the UK by Credit Reference Agencies, 
current business practices, and the legal standing of credit reporting. It suggests areas and 
issues for further legal debate and policy consideration. 
Ultimately, this study puts forward the case for specific legislative intervention to strike a 
balance between privacy rights, discrimination concerns, and the needs of the credit industry. 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper focuses on the activities carried out in the UK by private sector Credit Reference 
Agencies (CRAs) that compile databases on consumers’ financial transactions, borrowings, 
payment behaviour and other aspects of household finances.  This information, together with 
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information from other sources, is disseminated to their member clients, i.e. third party lender 
organisations1. 
CRAs store and process information about almost every adult who lives, or has lived, in the 
United Kingdom2. They maintain a full data sharing mechanism based on the collection of 
data from the various lenders of information about their customers and, at the same time, 
provide those same lenders with consumer credit reports. 
Consumer information sharing has become the most extensively used tool to underwrite 
decisions on borrowings or the supply of goods and/or services to customers.  Lenders, in 
fact, access credit reference databases in order to evaluate a consumer’s credit application and 
his/her creditworthiness. 
However, despite the copious economic literature on the importance of sharing consumer 
credit information by a wide source of lenders, little attention has been paid either to privacy 
concerns or to the discriminatory consequences of credit reporting. 
Such concerns seem particularly relevant today because of the growing type and number of 
personal data collected and disclosed to third parties, as well as the expanding use of data.  
These aspects are exacerbated by the sophistication and advances in computer technology and 
information systems. 
To this purpose, there has been scant debate, especially amongst lawyers and legislators, 
concerning the legal framework of such information systems and the uses of credit reporting 
data. 
In an attempt to provide a comprehensive description and analysis of the activities carried out 
by CRAs and their legal standing, this article aims at suggesting promising areas and issues 
for further consideration and debate, particularly as far as it concerns legal issues and policy 
considerations. 
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As such analysis leads to more questions than it answers, this work puts forward the case for 
ad hoc legislative intervention for credit reporting to strike a balance between legitimate 
individual privacy rights, discrimination concerns, and the needs of the credit industry. 
 
1. Credit Reference Agencies 
 
CRAs are private companies that compile databases that (potential) lenders can access to help 
them evaluating a consumer’s credit application3. They provide information to potential 
lenders about an applicant’s credit record, producing a 'Credit Report' that contains details of 
the payment and credit history of an individual, financial accounts and the way they have 
been managed, as well as other information of interest to the credit industry. 
The consumer's credit data collected and processed by CRAs are supplied to the agencies by 
the lenders themselves, which builds the CRAs’ databases to share the information about their 
customers. 
It must be noted from the outset that the CRAs usually integrate their databases with data 
from other sources, such as, for example, electoral rolls, Court judgements, bankruptcies and 
voluntary arrangements, and other private information provided by other organisations (such 
as, for example, the Council of Mortgage Lenders), which compile additional information 
referring to an individual thus forming a single file. 
Such files are then made available in the form of a Credit Report which is provided to the 
(potential) lenders for a fee paid to the one or more CRAs which they have decided to 
interrogate each time someone applies for credit or hire purchase. 
CRAs often claim that the information is supplied by the lenders on a reciprocal basis, i.e. the 
lenders are able to access the databases only if they contribute to it for the benefit of all the 
other contributing member lenders4. 
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However, this mechanism - based on what has been called the ‘reciprocity principle’ - relies 
on agreements between private parties and there is no ad hoc cogent law or regulation in place 
to date.  As it has been reported in recent years, in fact, a number of lenders themselves have 
become concerned that such arrangements on ‘reciprocity’ were gradually breaking down.  
Moreover, there are considerable doubt concerning the different interpretations of what 
exactly would constitute the ‘reciprocal supply and use of data’, since personal data are now 
processed, communicated, and analysed with sophistication that no one imagined when data 
sharing schemes were first established 25-30 years ago5. 
In addition, the technological change and growth in the number and range of techniques used 
today, such as consumer risk scoring (including behavioural and sociological customer 
scoring), loan or mortgage rating, risk screening, monitoring, propensity modelling, debtor 
tracking and support to debt collection, were not in place when the industry first began to 
consider data sharing as a valuable instrument built for lending purposes. 
Finally, it may be worth noting that it is not always easy to draw the line and make a 
distinction between the use of consumers data for credit risk management and its use for 
marketing purposes, nor is there a law or regulation specifically designed to restrict new 
business sectors or government agencies as potential future data users and suppliers as client 
members of CRAs. 
 
2. The stated role/function of Credit Reference Agencies 
 
The financial industry and the economic literature claim several justifications for credit 
reporting systems and their consequent use. 
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a) CRAs are meant to provide to the credit industry and the market organised information on 
the performance of borrowers.  They gather information on the payment history and accounts 
of borrowers and issue a credit report prior to the underwriting of a borrowing or the supply 
of goods and/or services which would be paid at a later stage.  Thus, CRAs are often cited as 
providing instruments and services in the evaluation of the creditworthiness of an individual 
applicant and his/her ability to repay the debt.  Credit reporting systems, therefore, would 
provide lenders with credit management tools helping them to master and manage their own 
business risk, as well as to set loan terms according to the level of risk of the individual 
borrower as determined by his/her credit history and accounts6. 
Economic theory has long stressed the importance of information in credit markets.  Theorists 
have devoted a large body of analytical studies aimed at demonstrating that asymmetric 
information between borrowers and lenders poses problems of bad debts, moral hazard and 
adverse selection7. 
The theory suggests that the lack of information on borrowers can prevent the efficient 
allocation of credit in a market and that one way that lenders can improve their knowledge of 
borrowers is through their observation of clients over time8. 
A study commissioned and published by the World Bank stresses “since one of the best 
predictors of future behaviour is past behaviour, data on how a potential borrower has met 
obligations in the past enables lenders to more accurately evaluate credit risk, easing adverse 
selection problems.  At the same time, credit reports strengthen borrower discipline and 
reduce moral hazard, since late or nonpayment with one institution can result in sanctions by 
many others. (...) A borrower’s ‘good name’ (reputation collateral) provides an incentive to 
meet commitments much the same way as does a pledge of physical collateral, thus reducing 
moral hazard”9. 
 5
As the theory goes on, CRAs play a pivotal role as a borrower discipline device as he or she 
would know that a default in re-payment compromises his/her reputation with all the other 
potential lenders on the market, cutting him/her off from credit or obtaining it at more costly 
terms10. 
Although lenders would loose the exclusivity of data in terms of competition one versus the 
other, they would ultimately gain by sharing information as this accumulation of data enables 
them to distinguish the good borrowers from the bad ones.  Information sharing would make 
it easier to predict with a certain degree of confidence the future payment behaviour of 
applicants allowing lenders to attract good borrowers and offering them better terms and 
conditions, thus promoting market competition that could ultimately result in benefit to 
consumers11. 
According to the economic literature, thus, the adverse selection problem indicates that should 
lenders fail to distinguish the good borrowers from the bad ones, all accepted borrowers 
would be charged at a higher rate an average interest rate that mirrors their pooled 
experience12.  
Therefore, the distinction between good borrowers from the bad ones would allow lenders on 
the one hand to offer more advantageous prices to lower-risk borrowers (i.e. those with an 
immaculate or good credit history) while, on the other hand, higher risk borrowers would be 
offered high interest rates or would be rationed out of the market because of the lenders’ 
unwillingness to offer these borrowers accommodating rates13. 
 
b) Credit reporting systems are valued as instrumental tools in expanding the breadth and 
depth of financial markets and in strengthening the financial system. 
They are reportedly said to: 
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(i) reduce transaction and loan processing costs and time required to process 
applications;  
(ii) improve the lenders’ client portfolio quality by monitoring it and identifying 
potential problems;  
(iii) provide cost-efficient standardised and objective criteria for credit analysis;  
(iv) increase competition in the sector: credit data would promote transparency and 
reduce the information advantage that a lender has over its existing clients, which 
in turn could lead both to lower prices offered to consumers and greater access to 
credit;  
(v) facilitate distant transactions (such as, for instance, e-finance or internet 
transactions and banking);  
(vi) provide opportunities for new financial products to consumers and enable lenders 
to serve consumers who were otherwise underserving or ignored (such as, for 
example low-income consumers).  This, in turn, results in the development and 
sale of new products, accurate tailored pricing, targeting and marketing, which 
ultimately would contribute to the lenders' profitability14. 
 
Thus, access to up to date, accurate and instant information on potential borrower customers 
makes it easier and more cost efficient to assess and manage risk, reducing the engagement in 
bad business and resulting in improved client portfolio quality and profitability15. 
 
c) A third reason for the industry’s interest in CRAs – shared by the House of Commons 
Treasury Committee - is that through an extensive detailed collection and sharing of personal 
data they are considered to provide useful services in the fight against the growth of over-
indebtedness of a borrowing individual. 
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By sharing information, lenders are able to identify those (potential) borrowers who, although 
they fall within the definition of ‘good borrowers’, are already over-committed.  The use of 
credit reporting systems would confer to the credit industry the tools for responsible lending 
policies, protecting individuals from running up significant borrowings beyond their means16. 
Likewise, consumer protection groups currently agree that full-data sharing should represent 
the way forward to stem the problems of consumer over-commitment by hampering 
responsible lending.17
 
d) Fraud prevention is a further function of CRAs. 
Consumer credit data, in fact, can be used to compare a current credit application with 
previous ones by matching the application details. Thus, it would be possible to detect 
omissions, the data an applicant would like not to disclose, or inaccurate or untrue details 
within the applicant's history.  Similarly, these databases would be used to detect multiple 
applications in the applicant’s name within the same timeframe, or the use by the applicant of 
different names for the same banking details or other patterns of fraudulent behaviour18. 
 
e) Finally, although CRAs are more closely associated with their role in supporting the 
consumer credit market, their use in the economy extends to other private transactions, such 
as, for example, commercial transactions, property rentals, telecom subscriptions, insurance 
contracts, and employment screening. 
 
3. What information is collected, processed, and disclosed to third parties? 
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CRAs store, process, and disseminate consumers’ files containing data on their previous and 
existing accounts, which normally include detailed information about mortgages, bank 
accounts, store cards, charge cards, credit cards, loan accounts, and even mail order accounts. 
Each file contains the name of the borrower, his/her date of birth, current address, previous 
addresses, linked addresses, marital and employment status, people that have a financial 
relationship with him or her, number of accounts, amounts, types, stage (loan under approval, 
withdrawn, denied) and terms of the accounts, amount of monthly instalments, amount of 
residual instalments, historical data, number of defaults, amount of arrears, name of granting 
institutions, payment history (both regulars and in default), dates19. 
Each personal file, then, has status codes assigned to it by the lender, showing whether it is up 
to date, in arrears, by how much in arrears, if the account is in default and how many times 
the repayment has been late. Closed accounts show the status codes for up to three years prior 
to closure20. 
A survey carried out by the World Bank indicates that a large majority of CRAs worldwide 
also collect information on taxpayer IDs (75%), loan rating data (70%), and type and value of 
collateral used to secure loans (around 50%)21. 
On the consumer’s credit files there is also a record of the searches, including the dates and 
the reason for the search, together with the identity of organisations that have accessed or 
amended the file. 
 
In addition, CRAs usually collect and make use of public record information to integrate each 
consumer’s file. 
Such information include data from the following sources: 
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(i) the electoral or voters’ roll (which is used to match the address on it with the 
address provided in the current and previous applications, thus verifying in 
addition how long the applicant has lived at a given address for);  
(ii) County Court Judgements entered for sums of money in the county courts of 
England and Wales (in Scotland judgements are called decrees and are issued by 
the small claims and summary causes sheriff courts) - in most cases CRAs are 
informed about judgements as soon as they are entered by the courts;  
(iii) bankruptcies;  
(iv) county court administration orders22. 
 
Data from the Council of Mortgage Lenders’ Repossession Register is also held by the CRAs, 
which show whether an individual has had a property repossessed or has given it up 
voluntarily23. 
Moreover, credit reports may also contain data from the Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance 
System (CIFAS), which contains information regarding situations which occur when a fraud 
has been previously detected or it has been attempted.  It allows member organisations to 
exchange details of applications for products or services which are believed to be fraudulent 
because the information provided by the applicant fails the verification checks (it should be 
stressed that the information filed may not directly relate to the individual concerned but 
could indicate that someone else has tried to impersonate him)24. 
Finally, it is common to include in the databases information from Gone Away Information 
Network (GAIN) that contains details of individuals who have moved home leaving behind 
debts without notifying a forwarding address.25
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It has to be additionally pointed out that CRAs’ databases may also contain in the file of an 
individual information about one or more persons other than the relevant individual. 
The circumstances in which information about another person(s) may appear on someone’s 
credit reference file relate to situations where  
(i) the name(s) is(are) the same or similar and the address is the same;  
(ii) the CRA knows beforehand that such other person(s)’ information applies to such 
individual;  
(iii) those other person(s) has(have) the same surname as such individual and they have 
been living at the same time either at the current or at any other previous address 
contained in such individual’s file (this aggregate information enables CRAs to 
include information on the applicant about family members and their payment 
history)26. 
 
It is worthy of note that it is the duty of the individual to request the CRAs to eventually 
create a dissociation in the occurrence that a financial connection does not in fact exist27. 
By way of example, the sophistication of today’s information systems has made available to 
lenders functionalities which provide them with summarised data relating to the same family 
individuals or aliases who live, or have lived, at the same address declared by the applicant. 
These databases are normally utilised when a lender has minimal information on the applicant 
upon which to base the lending decision. 
CallCredit, a CRA in the UK, reports that if the applicant opts-in, information will be returned 
on same family individuals regardless of whether or not a financial association exists between 
them and the applicant28.  Unfortunately, no mention is made about the other family 
individual being informed and if he or she has provided consent - arguably a very unlikely 
circumstance29. 
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Information about transient associations (a temporary association between two individuals, 
for example two students who purchase goods together while at the University) is also in 
place.  To this end, there is a flag in the individual file which indicates the transient 
association and, if selected, details of the credit agreement will appear on the applicant's credit 
report individually (although an association will not be created)30.  Even under the latter 
circumstance, no reference is made about the other individual being informed and if he or she 
has provided his/her consent. 
 
An important distinction to be drawn when referring to the type of data collected and 
distributed by CRAs is the one between the so-called ‘black’ information and ‘white’ 
information. 
‘Black’ information usually refers to negative consumer data, (information about defaults on 
payments, delays, delinquencies, bankruptcies etc).  That is, information with a negative 
connotation on the payment history and the financial behaviour of the data subject. 
‘White’ information, by contrast, refers to positive consumer data, i.e. information about the 
financial standing, payments and other details which do not indicate a default or a late 
payment. 
Attempts have also been made to classify ‘off-white’ or ‘grey’ information, which would refer 
to data on accounts which demonstrate some signs of problems but have not yet proceeded to 
the state of being ‘black’, i.e. accounts which are in acceptable time arrears with no warning 
to the customer being yet issued by the lender31. 
Whatever classification one prefers to draw, CRAs in the UK collect, store, and distribute 
both ‘black’ and ‘white’ information (including, of course, ‘off-white’ or ‘grey’ information 
as mentioned above). 
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It has to be added, finally, that CRAs are currently lobbying for more information to be made 
available, so that increasing amounts of data can be brought into play in lending decisions.32
 
4. The trends in the use (or misuse) of credit reference data 
 
a) Credit Reports, creditworthiness, and ID verification 
As mentioned above, the principal use of the CRAs databases is for the assessment of the 
creditworthiness of credit applicants. 
CRAs persistently assert that they do not hold blacklists, nor do they provide any opinion 
about whether or not an applicant should be given credit.  
Agencies believe that in these circumstances they cannot be held responsible for rejections as 
they do not make lending decisions33. 
 
As it has already been reported, further uses of credit reference data include ID verification of 
credit applicants, fraud prevention, and the other uses listed above. 
 
So far, this work has focused on the core activity carried on by CRAs. 
It should be taken into consideration, however, that CRAs take decisive advantage of their 
ability to provide first-hand information and knowledge by offering additional services to the 
industry.  Such additional services include, among the others, credit scoring services (which 
include scorecards design, development, set-up, analysis, and training), consulting, 
application processing, small business information reports, market and consumer research, 
debt collection, and marketing services34. 
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The following are just examples to highlight the trends in the use (or misuse) of CRAs’ 
databases: 
 
b) Credit Scoring 
CRAs are normally the providers of credit scoring systems to lenders. 
Credit Scoring models, otherwise also known as ‘Scorecards’, may be described as 
mathematical algorithms or statistical programmes that determine the probable repayments of 
debts by consumers, thus assigning a score to an individual based on the information 
processed from a number of data sources. 
New technological advances, however, have made it possible for lenders to make extensive 
use of sophisticated credit scoring techniques. 
It is well known in the consumer credit sector, as well as being explicitly declared by the UK 
Information Commissioner’s Office, that most, if not all, lenders use credit scoring systems 
which give points to various pieces of information on the customer’s application form, such 
as age35, job, income level, marital status, etc. as well as data taken from the credit records 
processed by the CRAs. 
It is nowadays widely accepted by lenders that scoring (potential) customers helps the lender 
to predict whether the applicant is an acceptable risk, i.e. credit is normally granted if the 
score is above the lender’s pass mark, while if the score is below such mark the applicant is 
more likely to be turned down (although the credit score that lenders give to the applicant will 
not form part of the files that the CRAs keep about the data subjects)36. 
For example, the scores given to an individual may depend on the number of changes of 
address, in addition to other account records.  In fact, the more times someone changes 
address, no matter the reason(s), the more it may be likely to lead to a lower score as it could 
signal that the applicant might be unreliable and a high risk37. 
 14
Another controversial example of the use of scoring techniques provided by CRAs and used 
by lenders is represented by assigning points to predict fraud risk to the type of house owned 
or rented by a data subject, as well as the postcode data where the property is located.38
 
Although credit scoring systems have traditionally been used to predict risk, they are also 
more and more widely used to assess affordability. In the words of a spokesman of a major 
CRA in the UK, “although a prospective borrower may have a range of existing credit 
facilities all of which are being paid on time, he or she may be so heavily committed that one 
more facility may result in that individual becoming over-indebted across his/her total 
borrowings”39. 
A recent trend practiced by most lenders is the one of scoring their existing customers every 
month, thus ensuring that they are one of the first lenders to contact the customers when an 
early delinquency sets in, not only to renegotiate the repayment but also to better secure the 
credit and limit exposure.40
 
c) Marketing 
Most large organisations now use credit reference data at the marketing stage to screen out 
prospect customers that have significant levels of defaulted accounts with other lenders.41
As consumers increasingly spread their financial relationships to more than one supplier, most 
lenders use credit information to assess the risk of new customers and to help decide what 
products and facilities to offer them.42
 
d) Government tapping databases 
Recently, it has been reported that in the attempt to thwart bogus applications for UK 
passports in an effort to fight terrorism, “the data sharing provisions of the draft identity cards 
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bill are to allow the UK Passport Service to tap into the databases of CRAs and other 
commercial organisations”43. 
Thus, the use of credit reference data will be a likely part of the new proposed national ID 
cards and will be an integral element of ‘biographical footprint checking’ of applications.  To 
this purpose, the UK Passport Service is already engaged in a data sharing project with a 
CRA, the Home Office immigration and nationality department, the Department of Work and 
Pension and the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency44. 
 
Even the Department for Constitutional Affairs, which also has access to the Police National 
Computer to locate defaulters, has signed a contract to use the database of a CRA to track 
fine-dodgers.  According to a recent report, magistrates will use the 500 million records kept 
by such CRA to pursue a total of £276 million in unpaid court fines in England and Wales45. 
 
e) Expanding areas 
The use of CRAs is expanding. For example, a CRA has recently delivered its findings to the 
UK Water Industry and Government bodies after conducting pioneering research into water 
indebtedness46.  As the company reports, with its comprehensive databases and expertise it 
"was able to help the water industry better understand and profile its own debtor data, 
building the foundation for future industry research and individual company debtor 
understanding”47. 
 
A further situation representing an example of the expanding use of credit reference data is for 
employee monitoring.  Employees’ private life is increasingly monitored through the use of 
information held by CRAs (for example to verify that they live where they declare to live, as 
well as to verify the data on their curriculum vitae/job application form or their 
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creditworthiness, particularly if they work in the financial services sector). The UK 
Information Commissioner simply advised that businesses should, in addition to providing the 
workers with the notice that checks are made on them, ensure that if CRAs are asked to 
provide such information on workers, the agencies must be told of the use to which the 
information will be put48. 
 
Whether a private company that is the repository of the type and amount of such information 
should be allowed to carry on such other activities and provide those services is debatable.  In 
any event, it is not surprising that the entire business carried out by CRAs raises key privacy 
concerns, as well as the question of whether the core activity of CRAs coupled with their 
mentioned additional products and services represent a legitimate use, or rather a misuse, of 
credit reference data. 
 
5. Institutional and legal standing of credit reporting 
 
The examples provided above about the uses of credit reference data show that in the absence 
of specific legislation there exists almost limitless potential utilisation of CRAs’ databases 
and services. 
 
In Great Britain there is no law that specifically regulate credit reporting activities. 
There are, however, two laws that have a significant impact on consumer credit reporting 
activities: 
 
(i) the 1974 Consumer Credit Act (which will be modernised and reformed by the 
Consumer Credit Bill), and  
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(ii) the 1998 Data Protection Act transposing EU Directive 95/46/EC.  
 
Other laws, regulations, or codes of practices to be taken into account would also include: 
 
(iii) Bank secrecy/confidentiality laws; and  
(iv) the Banking Code of Practice. 
 
(i) The 1974 Consumer Credit Act established the early regulation of the credit reporting 
industry.  The Act contains a number of provisions available to consumers to remedy the main 
mischief that may occur. 
Under Section 25 of the Act all CRAs must be licensed by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), 
the latter having the right to revoke such licence, inter alia, for deceitful or oppressive 
business practices, or unfair or improper conduct. These powers available to the OFT are 
commonly said to ensure that CRAs disclose credit information about individuals strictly for 
the purposes intended.  Section 157 puts the lenders under a duty to disclose to the consumer 
at his/her request the name and address of any CRA to which the lender applied for 
information. Section 158 then goes on to oblige CRAs to provide the consumer with a copy of 
the file relating to him/her, together with a statement49 of his/her rights to have mistakes 
corrected under section 159.50
The Consumer Credit Bill will reform the Consumer Credit Act 1974.  The aim of the Bill is 
to protect consumers and create a fairer and more competitive credit market. 
There have been some pressure from the industry to use the Consumer Credit Bill as a vehicle 
for addressing the issue of data sharing. 
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However, such issue has been considered wider than just those covered by the Consumer 
Credit Act.  Data sharing does not therefore feature in the Bill and the Government does not 
propose to make any changes relating to CRAs.51
 
(ii) It should be noted from the outset, however, that the 1974 Consumer Credit Act does 
not address the issues of data collection, processing, and dissemination thus ignoring privacy 
concerns. 
Thus, today the primary mechanism for regulating the activities of consumer credit reporting 
in the UK is the 1998 Data Protection Act (DPA) transposing EU Directive 95/46/EC52.  The 
Act includes a notice of purpose of the data collection, the types of data that are collected, 
basic rights of access, as well as principles of good practice in which data have to be 
processed fairly and lawfully, and for only limited purposes and a limited time.  The Act also 
provides that a data subject has the right to prevent the data controller from taking evaluation 
decisions concerning him or her by automated means alone53. 
For the provisions of the Act, CRAs are data controllers. This is so because they decide why 
and how they process personal data54. 
 
Thus, in accordance with the DPA, a lawful credit transaction involving CRAs should be 
construed as follows: 
 
1) At the time a person makes a credit application, lenders should inform and obtain the 
consumer’s consent in order to carry out a search at a CRA at the time he or she makes 
the credit application.  As already pointed out above, such search refers to data of past 
transactions of the data subject. 
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2) As each search generates new data (i.e. the search flag and the related information in 
the CRAs databases), the data subject should be informed and provide his/her consent 
about such new data being generated, processed and passed to CRAs, as well as the 
other lenders for future eventual applications, including notice as to the scope and 
length of time of such data processing. 
3) Once the lenders have agreed to grant a credit line, thus entering into a credit contract, 
they should inform and seek the consumer’s consent to pass the relevant information 
to CRAs for future (eventual) searches relating to new and different credit 
applications, including notice as to the scope and length of time of such data 
processing. 
4) In the event a lender decides to refuse the grant of a credit line to the applicant, it 
should inform and seek the data subject’s consent to generate and communicate such 
new data (i.e. the application being refused) to CRAs. 
 
Each instance of consent, as a general rule, should be the free choice of the individual. 
 
It could be suggested, finally, that the above notices and consents should be separate from the 
notice and consent which a customer gives for the processing of his/her data for the specific 
purposes of the credit relationship with the lender at stake. Such separate notice, in addition, 
should already contain the specific name and address of the CRA which will become data 
controller, as well as the third parties to whom the data will be disclosed which, in turn, will 
eventually also become data controllers in accordance with the provisions of Section 1(1) of 
the DPA55. 
By contrast, according to current practice, it is the data subject who has the burden to make a 
written request to the lender asking for the name and address of any CRA to which the lender 
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applied for information as to his/her financial standing at any antecedent time56.  The issue 
concerning the right of an individual to access personal data in relation to the name and 
address of all third parties that have had, or will have, access to such information through 
CRAs, however, proves certainly more difficult and not supported by practice. 
 
It seems the case, however, that consumers do not have much choice if they do not want to be 
refused credit.  The consumer's consent with regard to the searches to be carried out in the 
CRAs’ databases , in fact, seems to be viewed both mandatory and assumed (i.e. implied 
consent).  Lenders say that the lack of such consent would impede them from taking the credit 
application any further.  No consent, no credit (i.e. enforced consent). 
Moreover, lenders make it a condition of the credit contract that at a later stage they have the 
right to pass the information concerning such specific credit line to CRAs, which in turn have 
the right to disseminate the same to their client members, such clause seeming to be not 
negotiable (no consent, no contract). 
 
(iii) and (iv) As it has been pointed out above, lenders not only subscribe as client members 
to CRAs for the use of the information of the databases but also contribute information to 
them.  This is where questions of potential breaches of bank secrecy/confidentiality may arise. 
It has been already accepted for some time through banking practice that lenders reveal the 
so-called ‘black’ information to CRAs. By contrast, banks have stated in the Banking Code of 
Practice that no ‘white’ information would be passed to CRAs without the consent of the 
customer (the Banking Code of Practice March 2005, para 13.8)57. 
However, whether there is a legal justification for such practices (concerning both ‘black’ and 
‘white’ credit data) is problematic. 
 21
In fact, nothing is said in the Banking Code of Practice about its legal status and there is no 
suggestion that it confers legal rights on customers, although it purports to impose liabilities 
on them. As it is expressly stated that it is ‘voluntary’, it may well be suggested that it has no 
legal effect at all (but, as subscribing banks advertise that they adhere to it and make it 
available to customers, its provisions may not be treated as implied terms in the banking 
contract)58. 
In addition, there is no statutory law relating to the bankers’ duty of secrecy and the rules as 
set by precedents and terms implied in the contract between a bank and a customer. 
The duty of confidence by banks raises difficult questions and complex legal issues which are 
beyond the scope of this article.  
To summarise, the leading case is Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of 
England59, in which it was established that the bank owed its customer a legal, and not merely 
a moral, duty of confidentiality and could not lawfully disclose to third parties information 
concerning the customer’s affairs.  This duty is not absolute but it is qualified by four 
exceptions, namely: 
 
(a) where disclosure is under compulsion by law;  
(b) where there is a duty to the public to disclose;  
(c) where the interests of the bank require disclosure;  
(d) where disclosure is made by the express or implied consent of the customer. 
 
Legal scholars mainly assume that banks have been relying on either exception (c) the interest 
of the bank; or exception (d) consent of the customer; but it is arguable that banks have no 
entitlement to divulge customers’ credit information under the common law and that the 
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safest and proper course of action would be to ensure that they have the consent of the 
customer, either express or implied60. 
To this purpose, moreover, it is worth going back a little in history to look at the 1998 'Jack 
Report on Banking Service: Law and Practice' that looked at many aspects of the banker-
customer relationship61. 
It should be stressed from the outset that the Jack Report was never implemented, but its 
findings are nonetheless interesting. 
The recommendation in relation to CRAs and the possible disclosure of confidential 
information by banks was made that the extent of permitted disclosure 'in the interest of the 
bank' without customer consent should be clearly limited by statute, and that in any event 
exception (c) should not really be used other than in the narrowest of situations62. 
Therefore, this would leave a bank disclosing a customer's information having to obtain 
consent from him or her or be able to imply it. 
To what extent could a bank argue that a customer knew or ought to have known of all the 
uses of his/her personal data as outlined above in this work to justify arguing for implied 
consent? 
One suspects, therefore, that in such situation there would be ground to exclude the 
application of exception (c) and that consent should not be implied. 
The main barrier to the sharing of consumer data seems to be the interaction between the DPA 
and the common law duty of confidence.  The DPA, in fact, requires that any processing of 
personal data must be ‘lawful’.  Legal advice sought by the Information Commissioner about 
historic data concluded that “the above exceptions could not be used to justify the sharing of 
positive information without consent.  This legal advice also raised doubts as to whether these 
exceptions to the duty of confidence could be used to justify the sharing of negative 
information”.63
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 Under all these circumstances, thus, there could be a challenging ground for further legal 
analysis, in particular with reference to the issues relating to: 
 
(1) ‘extortionate or enforced consent’ (the same consideration first above written relating to 
the consent for processing under the 1998 Data Protection Act would apply);  
(2) if the Tournier Case could also apply and relate to lenders which are not banks (as it has 
been stressed elsewhere, in fact, a number of lenders are not banks);  
(3) the adequacy of case-law referring to a case heard in 1924 as compared to banking 
practises as applied in modern technological advances and sophistication. 
 
As far as the institutional point of view of credit reporting is concerned, finally, there is in 
place a complex system of enforcement and supervision. According to the 1974 Consumer 
Credit Act, the Department of Trade and Industry issues regulations, while the Office of Fair 
Trading has the duty to supervise the enforcement.  According to the DPA, however, the 
Home Office issues regulations and the Information Commissioner is the enforcement 
authority64. 
Secondary legislation on CRAs in the UK includes the Consumer Credit (Conduct of 
Business) (Credit References) Regulations 1977 No. 330, amended by the Consumer CRA) 
Regulations 2000 No. 290, and the Consumer Credit (Conduct of Business) (Credit 
References) (Amendment) Regulations 2000 No. 291. 
 
6. Issues for further consideration and debate 
 
 24
As it has already been stressed above, whether credit reporting practices comply with the 
DPA or the common law duty of confidence is open to discussion and would require a more 
detailed legal analysis and debate. 
Above all, however, it would be worthy to determine if the DPA or the Banking Code of 
Practice are adequate and relevant to the sophisticated and highly technological mechanisms 
of credit reporting, where data from different sources are easily and quickly aggregated, new 
data are automatically created (for example, the searches), and are disclosed to a potentially 
unlimited number of third parties for a growing number of expanding purposes. 
Moreover, previous research has already stressed that further consideration should be given to 
what constitutes the ‘essential information’ which allow the credit assessment process by 
lenders.65  
In this respect, it would certainly be a useful exercise to assess the necessity and scope of all 
the information provided by CRAs for the purpose of predicting the future behaviour of a 
borrower, matching them with the nexus about the likelihood of repayments with the 
contracted interests. Does the provision of all such information and the consequent intrusion 
into one’s private life find a justification for the carrying on of a profitable historical 
commercial business such as banking?  It should not be forgotten, to this purpose, that it is the 
lenders’ business to provide credit to borrowers and that they make their profit out of it, the 
risk being part of the business and yielded by further higher interests in case of defaults and 
arrears. 
For instance, in an analysis of what constitutes ‘essential information’ one of the main 
questions refers to the distinction between ‘black’ and ‘white’ data.  Whereas most people 
may accept the value of sharing ‘black’ data as a disciplinary instrument, at least where 
customers are informed and where they provide consent, the issue of sharing 'white' 
information proves more difficult.66
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 In any event, whatever the answer may be in relation to the technicalities above and far from 
underestimating them, the heart of the debate and the fundamental question referring to credit 
reporting is how far a consumer should be forced to sacrifice his/her own privacy in the 
interest of the credit industry (the general interest?), bearing in mind that the ‘utilitarian’ 
concerns of the credit industry cannot necessarily prevail over civil liberty and fundamental 
human rights concerns. 
Likewise, the above mentioned current consumer protection arguments supporting full-data 
sharing seem to neglect or sacrifice crucial consumer rights such as data protection. 
This raises the question about what the perception of consumer protection in this sector 
should be, i.e. whether protecting consumers from privacy intrusions and profiling in the 
technological era or, rather, paternalistically protecting them by making lenders responsible to 
impose limits to the access to credit. 
If the answer is that the latter circumstance should prevail, then another consequent issue to 
be raised next would be to what extent such perception of consumer protection should 
override the established right to privacy of individuals. 
 
To these ends, it should be taken into account that all privacy rights now benefit from, and 
should be interpreted in light of, Art. 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, incorporated into English Law by the Human 
Rights Act 199867. 
As already outlined, the entire credit reporting business is based on statistical considerations 
and there is no scientific evidence, nor a causal nexus, as to the certainty of the future 
behaviour of a human being68. 
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In fact, the major factors behind the creditworthiness or over-indebtedness of individuals were 
found to be unforeseen life events, such as sudden illness, loss of job, death of someone close, 
etc. rather than a mismanagement of resources69. 
Moreover, it could be argued that someone who has had problems in the past does not 
necessarily have problems at present or in the future. 
Last but not least, an individual may well also have a low profile credit record from failing to 
make payments which are either undue or in conflict with the service provider70. 
What strikes someone attention is that information about defaults are passed on to CRAs (and 
then, in turn, disseminated) simply by the lenders so affirming, regardless of any judicial 
hearing having taken place, thus rising questions as to whether is there any respect for the 
certainty and rule of law.  
Is someone guilty for failing to pay a lender back because the lender simply says so or 
because a judge has taken a decision by law accordingly? 
 
The number of uses of consumers credit data raises concerns not only about privacy but also 
about discrimination. 
If it is certainly true that “no one has a right to credit”71, it is also almost certainly indubitable 
that no one should suffer discrimination, especially by mean of instruments that do not have a 
causal connection with the activity carried out nor a basis of conclusive evidence. 
When people are refused credit they should not become more vulnerable to either getting 
credit at more expensive rates and disadvantageous contract terms (sometimes to the point of 
extortionate credit deals) or, even worse, to being the victims of usury in the black market. 
 
Conclusion 
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All such concerns may open the debate on how far private organisations should go and if the 
use of credit reporting data for an indefinite number of products and services is legitimate or 
not.  
In fact, it seems that the expanding use of credit reporting, coupled with the many different 
activities that CRAs carry on, does not find limits in today’s law, thus being open to further 
new technological advances and findings. 
Ultimately, it would be worth exploring whether specific regulation of this market is 
necessary to avoid the arbitrary use of credit reference information and the arbitrary 
positioning of privately owned CRAs in the modern society. 
As this work has attempted to point out, an attentive analysis of credit reporting leads to more 
legal questions and concerns than the positive law answers. 
A fair balance would most certainly be required between legitimate individual privacy rights, 
discrimination concerns and the needs of the credit industry. 
If the smooth operation and further development of an efficient financial market is important 
for the economy, at the same time there is a duty to preserve the right of the individual to the 
privacy of his/her transactions as well as a fair and legitimate use of his/her personal data. 
The task of the law would be arguably to provide a response to concerns and to strike a 
balance between different interests: thus, it could be put forward that there is a case for credit 
reporting not to be an exception. 
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